Ehud Lehrer and Rann Smorodinsky. “Compatible Measures and Merging“, Mathematics of Operations Research, 21 (3), 697–706, 1996.
Ehud Lehrer and Rann Smorodinsky. “Merging and Learning” in Statistics, Probability and Game Theory: Papers in Honor of David Blackwell (Tom Ferguson, Lloyd Shapley and J.B. MacQueen, eds.), IMS Lecture Notes-Monograph Series, Volume 30, 1996.
Ehud Lehrer and Rann Smorodinsky. “Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information“, Games and Economic Behavior, 18, 116–134, 1997.
Alvaro Sandroni and Rann Smorodinsky. “The Speed of Rational Learning“, International Journal of Game Theory, 28, 199–210, 1999.
Matthew O. Jackson, Ehud Kalai and Rann Smorodinsky. “Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited”, Econometrica, 67 (4), 875–894, 1999.
Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer and Rann Smorodinsky. “Calibrated Forecast and Merging“, Games and Economic Behavior (special issue in honor of David Blackwell), 29, 151–169, 1999.
Ehud Lehrer and Rann Smorodinsky. “Relative Entropy in Sequential Decision Problems“, Journal of Mathematical Economics. 33, 425–439, 2000.
Nabil Al-Najjar and Rann Smorodinsky. “Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence“. Journal of Economic Theory, 92, 318–342, 2000.
Nabil Al-Najjar and Rann Smorodinsky. “Provision of Public Goods with Bounded Project Costs“. Economics Letters, 67, 297–301, 2000.
Rann Smorodinsky. “The Reflection Effect for Constant Risk Averse Agents”, Mathematical Social Sciences, 40, 265–276, 2000.
Nabil Al-Najjar and Rann Smorodinsky. “Large Non-Anonymous Repeated Games“, Games and Economic Behavior, 37 (1), 26–39, 2001.
Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky and Rakesh Vohra. “Calibration with Many Checking Rules“. Mathematics of Operations Research, 28 (1), 141–153, 2003.
Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Sequential Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems”, Twentieth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-2004), 2004.
Alvaro Sandroni and Rann Smorodinsky. “Belief Based Equilibrium”. Games and Economic Behavior, 47 (1), 151–171, 2004.
Avraham Neyman and Rann Smorodinsky. “Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games”. Mathematics of Operations Research, 29 (4), 739–775, 2004.
Rann Smorodinsky. “Nash’s Bargaining Solution when the Disagreement Point is Random”. Mathematical Social Sciences, 50 (1), 3–11, July 2005.
Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations—The Anonymous Case”. Games and Economic Behavior, 55 (2), 385–406, May 2006 (Mini Special Issue: Electronic Market Design).
Uri Gneezy and Rann Smorodinsky. “All Pay Auctions—An Experimental Study”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 61/2, October, 2006
Nabil Al-Najjar and Rann Smorodinsky. “The Efficiency of Competitive Mechanisms under Private Information”. Journal of Economic Theory, 137, 383–403, 2007.
Nabil Al-Najjar, Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky and Jonathan Weinstein. “Testing Theories with Learnable and Predictive Representations“. Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 2203–2217, November 2010.
Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy”, The 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS) Conference, 2012.
Claudio Orlandi, Kobbi Nissim and Rann Smorodinsky. “Privacy Aware Mechanism Design.” EC2012, 2012.
Inbar Aricha and Rann Smorodinsky. “Information Elicitation and Sequential Mechanisms“. International Journal of Game Theory, 42 (4), 931–946, 2013.
Sergey Kuniavski and Rann Smorodinsky. “Greediness and Equilibrium in Congestion Games”. Economics Letters, 121 (3), 499–503, December 2013.
Sergey Kuniavski and Rann Smorodinsky. “Equilibrium and Potential in Coalitional Congestion Games.” Theory and Decision, 76 (1), 69–79, 2014.
Gleb Polevoy, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 2 (1), March 2014.
Rakefet Rozen and Rann Smorodinsky. “Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms“. Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 2 (2), June, 2014.
Omer Levy, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Undivide and Conquer: On Selling a Divisible and Homogeneous Good“. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 15 (1), 1–23. ISSN (Online) 1935–1704, ISSN (Print) 2194–6124, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2014-0002, July 2014.
Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg, Ron Lavi and Rann Smorodinsky. “Job Security, Stability and Production Efficiency”. Theoretical Economics, Vol. 12 (1), January 2017.
Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Economic Recommendation Systems“. EC17, 2016.
Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg, Ron Lavi and Rann Smorodinsky. “Stability and Auctions in Labor Markets with Job Security”. Economics Letters. Volume 154, May 2017, Pages 55-58. 2017. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.024
Ronen Gradwohl and Rann Smorodinsky. “Perception Games and Privacy”. Games and Economic Behavior. Volume 104, 293-308. 2017.
Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz, “Segmentation, Incentives, and Privacy”. Mathematics of Operations Research 43(4):1252-1268, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2017.0903.
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko and Rann Smorodinsky. “Robust Forecast Aggregation”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS). Published ahead of print December 11, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1813934115
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky. “The One-shot Crowdfunding Game”. 19th ACM conference on Economics & Computation (EC), 2018.
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz and Rann Smorodinsky. “Stable Secretaries“. Forthcoming, Algorithmica, 2019
Itay Kavaler and Rann Smorodinsky. “On Comparison of Experts”. Games and Economic Behavior, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.005
Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Social Learning and The Innkeeper’s Challenge.” 20th ACM conference on Economics & Computation (EC), 2019.
Gail Gilboa-Freedman and Rann Smorodinsky. “On the Properties that Characterize Privacy Loss”. Mathematical Social Sciences. Volume 103, January 2020, Pages 59-68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.004
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko and Rann Smorodinsky. “Identifiable Information Structures”. Games and Economic Behavior. Volume 120, March 2020, Pages 16-27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.006
Gal Bahar, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz. “Multi-Issue Social Learning”. Mathematical Social Sciences. Volume 104, March 2020, Pages 29-39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.01.006
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky. “The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning.” 20th ACM conference on Economics & Computation (EC), 2019.
Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer and Rann Smorodinsky. “Prophet Inequalities for Bayesian Persuasion“. Accepted to the 29th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2020.
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko and Rann Smorodinsky. ” Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling”. Accepted to the 21st ACM conference on Economics & Computation (EC), 2020.
Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer and Rann Smorodinsky. “The Secretary Recommendation Problem”. Accepted to the 21st ACM conference on Economics & Computation (EC), 2020.
Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hah, Martin Hoefer and Rann Smorodinsky. “Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication“. The ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2021 (SODA ’21), 2021.